Programme of the 2009-2010 seminar

 

All the meetings take place in the  Meeting Room of Pavillon Jardin, 29 Rue d'Ulm, from 14h30 to 16h30.

October 16, 2009

 

Joëlle Proust (IJN):  "Metacognition, mental action and normative constraints".

 

November 13, 2009

 

Lucy O'Brien, (University College London): "Ordinary Self-consciousness"

 

November 27, 2009

Kirk Michaelian (IJN): "The Epistemology of forgetting"

 

December 4, 2009

Edina Roskies (Darmouth College): "Decision and freedom"

December 10-11, 2009

 

Workshop on Self-confidence, organized by T. Zalla & J.B. Van der Henst

http://anr.confidence.free.fr/index.php?option=com_conten...

 

December 18, 2009

Mikaël Cozic, (Université de Créteil & IHPST), Remarks on decision theory and cognition.

 

January 8, 2010

Maurice Bloch, (London School of Economics): Why anthropologists don't know what religion is: religion and ritual.

 

Next meetings: January 22, February 5, February 12.

Presentation of the 2009-2010 seminar

Epistemic  self-appraisal and normativity

Metacognition is the activity in which one performs epistemic self-appraisals in order to rationally allocate effort in learning, identify the sources of one's failures, and conduct efficient reasoning and planning. Appraisals are cognitive processes that allow an agent to compare a given observed outcome with the predicted one. Self-appraisals occur whenever one needs to know whether or not one's planned or executed action did or will attain its goal. Epistemic self-appraisals are those assessments that concern properties of one's cognitive contents such as veridicality (in the case of perception), accuracy or truth (in belief, memory, judgment etc.), soundness and relevance (in the case of reasoning), appropriateness and relevance (in the case of emotion).
The seminar will examine the status and possible origin of the epistemic norms used in epistemic self-appraisals. Are they hypothetical, instrumental norms relative to the basic epistemic goal of truth or true belief ? In which case, epistemic norms are norms of instrumental rationality, engineered on the basis of our actual or supposed epistemic means and circumstances. Or are they, rather, constitutive, objective constraints on information use in systems able to regulate their own cognitive parameters?  It will also study the dynamics of  epistemic norms and their interactions with other kinds of norms, such as aesthetic and moral norms.

References
1-    Alston, W.P. 2005. Beyond "Justification". Dimensions of epistemic evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2-    Audi, R.1993. The Structure of Justification.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3-    Benjamin, A.S., and Bjork, R.A.1996. Retrieval fluency as a metacognitive index, In L.M. Reder (ed.) Implicit memory and metacognition, 309-338, Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
4-    Elliott, A.J. & Harackiewicz, J.M. 1996. Approach and avoidance goals and intrinsic motivation: a mediational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 461-475.
5-    Engel, P.  1999. The Norms of the Mental, in Hahn, L. ed.. The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
6-    Gettier, E. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’,  Analysis 26, 3, 144-146.
7-    Gibbard, A. 2003. “Thoughts and Norms”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 21-30.
8-    Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Adaptive Thinking. Rationality in the real world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9-    Glenberg, A.M. & Epstein, W. 1987. Inexpert Calibration of Comprehension, Memory and Cognition, 15, 1, 84-93.
10-    Glenberg, A.M., Wilkinson, C., & Epstein, W. 1982. The illusion of knowing: Failure in the self-assessment of comprehension. Memory and Cognition, 10, 6, 597-602..
11-    Harman, G. 1995. Rationality. In E.E. Smith & D.. Osherson (eds.), Thinking, vol. 3, Cambridge: MIT Press, 175-211.
12-    Hookway, C. 2001. Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue. In A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 170-199.
13-    Hookway, C. 2008.  Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy, in M. Brady & D. Pritchard (eds.), Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Oxford: Blackwell, 75-92.
14-    Koriat A. & Goldsmith, M. 1996. Monitoring and Control Processes in the Strategic Regulation of Memory Accuracy. Psychological Review, 103, 3, 490-517.
15-    Koriat A. & Levy-Sadot R., 1999. The processes underlying metacognitive judgements: Information-based and experience-based monitoring of one’s own knowledge , in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology, S. Chaiken, & Y. Trope (eds.), New York, Guilford Press, 483-502.
16-    Koriat A., Ma’ayan H. & Nussinson R., 2006. « The intricate relationships between monitoring and control in metacognition : lessons for the cause and effect relation between subjective experience and behaviour », Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, pp. 36-69.
17-    Koriat, A. 2007. Metacognition and consciousness. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, & E. Thompson (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (289-325).
18-    Nisbett, R.E. 2003. The Geography of Thought. New York: Free Press.
19-    Nussinson, R. & Koriat, A. 2008. Correcting experience-based judgments: the perseverance of subjective experience in the face of the correction of judgment. Metacognition Learning, 3: 159-174.
20-    Pieschl, S. 2009. Metacognitive calibration – an extended conceptualization and potential applications. Metacognition and Learning, 4: 3-31.
21-    Pintrich, P.R. 2000. The role of goal orientation in self-regulated learning. In M. Boekaerts, P. Pintrich & M. Zeidner (eds.), Handbook of self-regulation. New-York: Academic Press, 452-502.
22-    Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23-    Proust, J. 2007. Metacognition and metarepresentation : is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition ? Synthese, 2, 271-295.
24-    Sloman, S.A. 1996. The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
25-    Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge UP.
26-    Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27-    Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. 1995. Relevance, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
28-    Tiercelin, C. 1997. ‘Peirce on norms, evolution and knowledge’, Transactions of the Peirce Society, vol.XXXIII n°1, 35-58.
29-    Unkelbach, Ch. 2007. Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing fluency in Judgments of Truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 33, 1, 219-230.
30-    Weinberg, J.M., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2001. Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29, 1-2, 429-460.
31-    Whittlesea, B.W.A. 1993. Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory and Cognition, 19, 6: 1235-1253.

Programme 2008-2009

Métacognition, action mentale et émotion - Metacognition, mental action and emotion

Most sessions will be held in English, Pavillon Jardin RDC, meeting room.

10 Octobre 2008
Joëlle Proust (IJN): "Metacognition, mental action and externalism".

24 Octobre 2008
Elisabeth Pacherie (IJN): "Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness"

21 Novembre 2008

Common session with Workshop: "the psychology of vagueness" (P. Egré):exceptionally Salle Dussane, ENS.

14h-15h: James Hampton (City University London):  'Second-Order Vagueness and Instability of Judgments'

15h-16h: Paul Egré (IJN): "Vagueness and Uncertainty".

28 Novembre 2008
Fabian Dorsch (University of Fribourg): "Self-awareness of mental agency".

 

3 Décembre 2008, exceptionally: from 11 am to 1 pm.
Richard Holton (MIT): "Wanting, Craving, Liking and Judging: What's Distinctive about Addiction?'

 

5-6 Décembre 2008
Workshop : "Self-Confidence", organized by  E. Pacherie et J. Dokic

9 Janvier 2009
Tiziana Zalla (IJN): "La Métacognition dans l'autisme"


23 Janvier 2009
Matthew Ratcliffe, (Durham University), "Delusional Atmosphere and Delusional Belief". Texte disponible sur l'intranet de l'APIC

 

6 Février 2009

Charo Rueda (Universidad de Granada): "Behavioral and brain benefits of training attention in young children"

 

6 Mars 2009

Till Vierkant (Edinburgh University): " Why managers are morally responsible or why the exercise of the will is voluntary even though basic mental actions are not".

 

20 Mars 2009

Jérôme Dokic (Institut Jean-Nicod): "On noetic feelings".

 

3 Avril 2009

Mathias Pessiglione, (Inserm, Salpétrière):   "Conscience, récompense et ganglions de la base"

Des motifs subconscients peuvent-ils nous manipuler ? Comment les incitations monétaires dopent-elles nos performances ? Comment nos choix sont-ils modelés par les succès ou les échecs du passé ? J’essaierai d’apporter des éléments de réponse à ces questions, à la lumière d’expériences de neuro-imagerie chez le sujet sain et d’observations comportementales chez le sujet cérébro-lésé. Mon séminaire s’inscrira dans le courant de la neuro-économie, qui vise à comprendre comment notre cerveau fonde ses espoirs de récompense, et comment ces espoirs vont nous pousser à agir et orienter notre action. Une attention particulière sera portée sur le système des ganglions de la base, dont je proposerais une modélisation computationnelle, pour tenter d’expliquer comment ces structures nous guident vers les récompenses, que nous en ayons conscience ou non.

 

10 Avril 2009

Richard Samuels (Ohio State University): Delusions as a Natural Kind.

 

 

29 Mai 2009: postponed  to the Fall

Lucy O'Brien (University College London): "Ordinary self-consciousness" :